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a b s t r a c t 
This paper aims to shed light on the impacts of imposing co-payment on public services, a strategy in- 
creasingly employed in the realm of publicly provided healthcare. We analyze the effect of imposing a 
charge for the individual appropriation of common resources. In our design, withdrawing the maximum 
amount is the dominant strategy for every player, but the resulting equilibrium is socially ineﬃcient. 
We ﬁnd that the presence of a price that is small enough to leave intact the conﬂict between individ- 
ual incentives and collective welfare is not effective in reducing appropriation among agents who have 
previously been acting without it. In fact, the upward trend in the average extraction of common funds 
continues after the introduction of a price. In an alternative treatment in which we impose copayment 
from the outset of the experiment, withdrawals are lower than in the free-access baseline. Our results 
provide insights on the conditions for the effectiveness of co-payment in curbing the over-consumption 
of public resources. 
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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2. Introduction 
We propose an experimental investigation of the effect of im-
osing a price for the subtraction of resources from a common
und. Our evidence sheds light on some relevant aspects related to
he effectiveness of co-payments in curbing the over-consumption
roblem, most notably in healthcare services. 
The conﬂict between individual and collective welfare in com-
on pool extraction problems has received attention since the
arly works by Gordon (1954) and Ostrom et al. (1994) , among
thers. We use the common pool resource paradigm as a metaphor
or publicly available services, whose excessive use by the indi-
iduals entitled to access it may lead to a collectively ineﬃcient
utcome. In other words, the level of individual appropriation is
etrimental to social welfare. In this context, our main question
s: does the introduction of a small co-payment reduce individual∗ Corresponding author. Fax: + 34 964728591. 
E-mail address: mgarcia@uji.es , mgarcia@eco.uji.es (A. García-Gallego). 
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Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101xtraction levels, thereby increasing eﬃciency and social welfare?
he limited magnitude of the price is designed so that the result-
ng context preserves intact the social dilemma-type of conﬂict be-
ween individual and collective incentives. Can the focus on the
rice and/or the sheer “pain of paying” help maintain a high level
f common resources? Or, on the contrary, could a “crowding-out”
ffect arise, whereby potentially prosocial subjects feel legitimated
y the price to extract more out of the common resource? 
The present policy context in Europe characterizes by effort s
o reduce public deﬁcits. User charges, often in form of “co-
ayments”, have been introduced for services that were previously
rovided for free, and exemptions to these charges have been re-
uced. These measures, frequently applied in healthcare policy, en-
ail a direct effect of a transfer from users to the public administra-
ion, while the main stated goal is to reduce the over-consumption
f public resources. As we focus on this second aspect, we ex-
lore the appropriation of resources following the introduction of
o-payments in comparison with i) a situation in which the co-
ayment is not introduced and ii) a situation where co-payment
as always existed, i.e. the resource was never available for free.tudy on the effect of co-payment in public services, Journal of 
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PThe ﬁrst comparison relates to many dilemmas currently faced
by European policy-makers in contexts of socialized healthcare.
The second comparison serves multiple purposes. On one hand,
it shows the effect of the introduction of co-payment as a nov-
elty compared with a stable rules regime. On the other hand, it
isolates the effect of the habit to consume the good for free. Our
evidence also provides insights on whether co-payment would be
more effective for new goods and services that were never publicly
available free of charge. 
2. Background 
Co-payments in healthcare, implying patients’ obligation to pay
a small part of the cost of service, represent one of the main ex-
amples of access charges in public services. They are frequently
imposed on primary care visits, on specialized care, and on the
purchase of pharmaceuticals. In European countries, there are wide
variations in terms of amounts, calculation methods (percentages,
ﬁxed fees, etc.) and with respect to which healthcare services are
subject to co-payment ( Espin and Rovira, 2007 ). Even bigger differ-
ences arise when considering the US and Canada ( Mas et al., 2011 ).
The rationale of co-payments is twofold. First, they might im-
prove the ﬁnancial situation of the payer. In the European context
of socialized medicine, this argument makes co-payments look un-
fair, as they cause a transfer of resources from those who need
more care to the rest of the population. Furthermore, as patients
may be unable to distinguish the actual beneﬁts, they could re-
duce the use of effective and ineffective healthcare in similar
proportions, as shown in the famous RAND experiment in the
U.S. ( Manning and Newhouse, 1987 ). This may lead to negative
health impacts and overall higher long-term healthcare expendi-
ture ( Gemmill et al., 2008 ). The second purpose consists of tackling
the excessive use of resources. Standard economic theory points
out that rational and selﬁsh people use free services up to the
point that they provide individual beneﬁts above individual non-
monetary costs (e.g. time). From the societal perspective, individ-
ual incentives lead to over-consumption, as social welfare would
be maximized if resources were consumed up to the point that
marginal beneﬁts (usually assumed to be decreasing) equal the so-
cial marginal costs of providing them. Thus, imposing an access
price in public services can contribute towards a better alignment
of individual and social incentives, thereby ameliorating the over-
consumption problem. 
In our experimental design, we observe whether the introduc-
tion of a price can enhance social eﬃciency, in a context where
experimental subjects have perfect information on their own bene-
ﬁt from appropriating public resources, and the corresponding cost
for the group they belong to. The size of the price is small, in or-
der to preserve the typical trade-off between individual and col-
lective beneﬁts. An example of a small co-payment is the “euro-
per-prescription” applied by the government of the Spanish Au-
tonomous Community of Catalonia in 2012. 
In this context, the introduction of a price may modify behavior.
As a price is obviously higher than zero, if the usage of resources is
a “normal” good, the demand effect should be negative. The pres-
ence of a price may also trigger a “pain of paying” effect, whereby
the sheer act of paying diminishes the pleasure of consuming a
good ( Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998 ). 
Possibly, a crowding-out effect may also be triggered by a
copayment, whose results go towards the opposite direction. As
described in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) , such effects arise
whenever people are, in principle, willing to cooperate and take
socially oriented choices but when confronted with a price, be-
come more “selﬁsh”. The presence of a price may shift the fo-
cus away from collective costs and suggest that the individual
can “legitimately” compare her own beneﬁt with the amount shePlease cite this article as: A. García-Gallego et al., An experimental s
Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101ould have to spend to access a public resource ( Gneezy and Rus-
ichini, 20 0 0 ). In this case, the individual appropriation of common
esources would increase. 
. Experimental design, procedures and predictions 
The experiment took place during the ﬁrst week of July 2012
t the Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEE) of the Univer-
ity Jaume I, located in Castellón, Spain. A total sample of 125
tudents participated: 35 in the “Baseline” (B) treatment, 30 in
he “Copay” (C) treatment, and 60 subjects in what we will re-
er to as the “Baseline + Copay” (BC) treatment. Presentations and
nstructions given to the students made no use of the word “co-
ayment”. Experimental sessions were programmed using z-Tree
 Fischbacher, 2007 ). 
In order to avoid possible doomsday effects, subjects did not
now ex ante the total number of rounds (30 in each session). At
he beginning of each round, subjects were put into groups of ﬁve
ubjects each. No subject knew the identity of her fellow group
embers. Subjects did know that, after each round, they would
e randomly re-matched and that, at the end of the experiment
hey would be paid according to the payoff achieved in a single,
andomly selected round. The random selection of a single round
s the basis for payment implies the removal of past accumulated
ealth effects. Before the beginning of the experiment, we tested
ubjects’ comprehension of the rules with easy questions on pay-
ffs arising from possible combinations of choices among group
embers. 
In treatment B, at the beginning of each round every group is
ssigned a common fund worth 100 euro. Each one of the ﬁve
roup members has the option of withdrawing an integer amount
etween 0 and 10 euro. Each euro withdrawn is transferred to her
rivate fund and reduces the common fund by 2 euro. At the end
f each round, what remains of the common fund is equally shared
mong the members of the group. Therefore, the payoff of a group
ember is the sum of her private fund and 20% of the amount left
n the common fund. For example, if X i is the amount extracted
y player i from the common fund, player i ’s payoff in any given
ound equals: 
 ayof f i (B ) = X i + 
1 
5 
( 
100 − 2 
5 ∑ 
j=1 
X j 
) 
i, j = 1 , ..., 5 
At the end of each round, each subject knows her own payoffs
nly, without any information regarding the payoffs of the other
embers of her group. 
In this context, the payoff-maximizing strategy for each player
s to withdraw the maximum amount permitted, i.e. 10 euro, as
ach euro taken away from the common fund only reduces her
hare by 2/5, i.e. 0.4 euro. Assuming rationality and selﬁshness, in
he Nash equilibrium, each group member withdraws 10 euro so
hat no amount is left in the common fund and each subject gets
 payoff of 10 euro in each round, including of course the one ran-
omly selected for the ﬁnal payment. Clearly, the Nash equilibrium
s not Pareto eﬃcient. In particular, if all members refrain from ex-
racting resources from the common fund, they enjoy a payoff of
0 euro each, i.e. twice as much as that obtained in the Nash equi-
ibrium. 
In treatment C, for each euro withdrawn from the common
ool, the subject has to pay 0.1 euro. All the co-payments enter
he common fund and are re-distributed among group members.
herefore, player i ’s payoff is: 
 ayof f i (C) = X i − 0 . 1 X i + 
1 
5 
( 
100 − 2 
5 ∑ 
j=1 
X j + 0 . 1 
5 ∑ 
j=1 
X j 
) 
i, j = 1 , ..., 5 tudy on the effect of co-payment in public services, Journal of 
6/j.socec.2016.08.002 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of average extraction, by treatment. 
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Table 1 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in dis- 
tributions among treatments. 
Treatments D p -value 
BC vs B 0 .0414 0 .191 
BC vs C 0 .1322 0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗
B vs C 0 .1637 0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
 
o  
 
I  
m  
r  
4  
u  
n  
a
 
m  
s  
b
 
i  
1
 
i  
l  
c
 
m  
B  
m  
s  
t  It is easy to see that the payoff-maximizing strategy for each
ubject is still to withdraw 10 euro. The Nash equilibrium strat-
gy proﬁle is the same as in treatment B, while the payoff per
ubject is still 10 euro per round (recall that the revenues from
o-payment are redistributed). In the case where no subject with-
raws anything from the common fund, each subject gets a 20
uro payoff like in the baseline treatment. 
In the BC treatment, during the ﬁrst 15 rounds subjects play un-
er the same rules as in the baseline. Before round 16, all subjects
re informed that during the rest of the session they will have to
ay 0.1 euro per each euro withdrawn , and that all acess payments
nter the common fund, precisely as in the C treatment. 
. Results 
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of average withdrawals in the three
reatments. The line in the middle corresponds to the split of the
ession between the ﬁrst 15 rounds and rounds 16–30, where co-
ayment is introduced in the BC treatment. 
Considering that in this experiment the cooperative choice con-
ists in refraining from withdrawing funds from the common
ool, it is immediate to observe that the pattern during the ﬁrst
ounds mirrors the one typically observed in public good games
 Ledyard, 1995 ), where cooperation is relatively high in the ﬁrst
ound and then decays progressively. Fig. 2 shows the decreasing
rend in the evolution of the common fund. 
An already expected pattern of our data is that no signiﬁcant
ifferences are observed between treatments B and BC along the
rst 15 rounds, where the rules are the same. More interestingly,
here are no differences in rounds 16–30 either. A Kolmogorov-
mirnov (K-S) non-parametric test in Table 1 , showing the differ-
nces among distributions 1 , conﬁrms this result. 
Result 1: There are not signiﬁcant differences in withdrawal lev-
ls across treatments B and BC . 
This result is noteworthy, as one could expect some impact
rom changing the rules of the game. This evidence, instead, shows
hat the introduction of the co-payment does not help curbing the
neﬃcient appropriation of funds by group members or, at best,
as a very short-lived effect. 1 Null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same distribution. 
Please cite this article as: A. García-Gallego et al., An experimental s
Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101On the other hand, behavior in treatment C does differ from the
ther two treatments, as also shown by K-S tests in Table 1 above.
Also in Fig. 1 , we observe the evolution of extractions levels.
n particular, when a co-payment exists from the beginning (treat-
ent C), average extraction increases substantially in the ﬁrst pe-
iods (namely from 4.867 units in period 1 to 7.333 units in period
) and then oscillates around 7.5 units, with a minimum of 6.933
nits in round 12 and a peak of 8.167 units in round 20. There is
o evidence of an upwards trend of extraction in this treatment
fter the period 6. 
In the other two treatments, B and BC, the increase is by no
eans limited to the ﬁrst rounds and, in particular, goes on in the
econd part of the session (rounds 16–30), as shown in Table 2
elow. 
The fact that extraction levels remain lower in treatment C dur-
ng periods 16 to 30 is remarkable, especially as rules in periods
6 to 30 are the same in treatments BC and in C. 
Result 2: In treatments B and BC withdrawal levels exhibit an
ncreasing trend also during the last 15 periods of the session. The
evel of extraction does not increase signiﬁcantly in treatment C as
ompared to the other two treatments. 
Table 2 shows an Ordinary Least Square group of panel data
odels, one for the ﬁrst 15 periods (aggregating treatments B and
C 2 to compare with C, the only treatment with a price) and three
odels for the last 15 periods, each one aiming at studying the
tatistical signiﬁcance of treatment differences in individual extrac-
ion per period. Hence, the dependent variable in each model is in-2 Henceforth B + BC. 
tudy on the effect of co-payment in public services, Journal of 
6/j.socec.2016.08.002 
4 A. García-Gallego et al. / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 0 0 0 (2016) 1–8 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: JBEE [m5G; August 10, 2016;11:11 ] 
Fig. 2. Evolution of the common fund after extraction, by treatment. 
Table 2 
O.L.S. with dependent variable: y = individual extraction. 
Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period < 15 Period > 15 Period > 15 Period > 15 
B + BC treatments 0 .9393 
(3 .26) ∗∗∗
B treatment 0 .8614 0 .2583 
(2 .98) ∗∗∗ (1 .02) 
C treatment −0 .6031 −0 .8614 
(−2 .27) ∗∗ (−2 .98) ∗∗∗
BC treatment 0 .6030 −0 .2583 
(2 .27) ∗∗ (−1 .02) 
Period 0 .10 0 0 0 .0170 0 .0959 0 .0771 
(3 .68 ∗∗∗) (0 .73) (5 .84) ∗∗∗ (3 .59) ∗∗∗
Period ∗ B 0 .0601 −0 .0187 
(1 .90) ∗ (−0 .69) 
Period ∗ C −0 .0788 −0 .6011 
(−2 .77) ∗∗∗ (−1 .90) ∗
Period ∗BC 0 .0789 0 .0187 
(2 .77) ∗∗∗ (0 .69) 
Period ∗B + BC 0 .0417 
(1 .34) 
R 2 within 0 .0901 0 .0811 0 .0811 0 .0811 
R 2 between 0 .0142 0 .0 0 07 0 .0 0 07 0 .0 0 07 
R 2 overall 0 .0533 0 .0580 0 .0580 0 .0580 
Wald chi2(2) 176 .71 159 .19 159 .19 159 .19 
Z-score in parentheses . 
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
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cdividual extraction, including dummy variables for each treatment
as the main explanatory variables. 
The ﬁrst regression explores behavior in the ﬁrst 15 periods.
It shows that average extractions increase over time (the im-
pact of “Period” is positive) and are signiﬁcantly higher in B + BC
than in C. These results are in line with the expectation that co-
payments entail a negative impact on appropriation behavior. The
variable Period ∗B + BC captures the time trend in B + BC with re-
spect to that in C. The upward trend is slightly stronger in B + BC
as compared to the C, but not to a statistically signiﬁcant level. 
The second regression shows that average extractions during
the last 15 periods are signiﬁcantly higher in B and BC than in C. 
Result 3: Withdrawal levels are lower over time in treatment C
than in the other two treatments, both during periods 1–15 and
during periods 16–30 . Please cite this article as: A. García-Gallego et al., An experimental s
Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101Variable Period ∗BC captures the time trend in BC with respect
o that in treatment C. Results show that the upward trend is sig-
iﬁcantly stronger in BC compared to the C. 
Regression (3) shows that average extractions are signiﬁcantly
ower in C than in BC. The impact of the variable Period ∗C is nega-
ive and signiﬁcant, indicating that extractions increase slower over
ime in C compared to treatment BC. 
Result 4: The extraction level in treatments B and BC increases
t a higher rate than in treatment C. 
Results from regression (4) show that the average extraction is
igniﬁcantly lower in C, and non-signiﬁcantly different in BC, than
n treatment B. Variable Period ∗C indicates that the extraction in-
reases at a lower rate over time in treatment C compared to the
aseline B. 
To summarize, in the last 15 periods, we observe that the level
f individual extraction in treatment C is signiﬁcantly lower, at 1%
evel of signiﬁcance, in comparison to treatment B ( −0.86 units)
nd treatment BC ( −0.60), while there are no signiﬁcant differ-
nces between B and BC. These results conﬁrm the ﬁndings stated
reviously. 
A non-parametric analysis of the three treatments show that
he distributions of strategies has remained mostly invariant along
he 30 period-horizon. In fact, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test compar-
ng extraction distributions between periods 1 and 5, 5 and 10, 10
nd 15, 15 and 20, 25 and 30, reveal signiﬁcant differences only
etween periods 1 and 5 of treatments B and C (KS, p = 0.019 and
 = 0012, respectively) while all other comparisons strongly reject
istributional differences (KS, p > 0.19). 
Fig. 3 shows the distributions of the extraction levels over time
y treatment. It is clear that, in treatment C, there is a higher fre-
uency of zero extraction and a lower frequency of full appropria-
ion in comparison with the other two treatments. 
Figs. 4 and 5 explore more in detail the evolution of the two ex-
reme choices, no extraction and full extraction, in the three treat-
ents. 
Once again, we observe that behavior in treatment C differs sig-
iﬁcantly from treatments B and BC: Full (zero) extraction choices
re more (less) frequent. Furthermore, the evolution of strategies
hows that the difference tends to increase during the second
alf of the experiment (rounds 16 to 30). We note, in particu-
ar, that the frequency of full extraction remains roughly stable
round 50% in treatment C, while it exhibits a clear upward trend
n treatments B and BC, indicating the convergence to fully non-
ooperative outcomes. tudy on the effect of co-payment in public services, Journal of 
6/j.socec.2016.08.002 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the extraction levels, by treatment. 
Fig. 4. Frequency of “0 extraction” by treatment. 
Fig. 5. Frequency of “full extraction” by treatment. 
Please cite this article as: A. García-Gallego et al., An experimental study on the effect of co-payment in public services, Journal of 
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f  5. Discussion 
There is a lively debate on the pros and cons of introducing
user charges for access to public services, especially in relation to
healthcare, traditionally ﬁnanced by taxes and social security con-
tributions in most European countries. 
The most appealing argument in favor of imposing co-payment
is the need to reduce over-consumption. In our experiment, we
explore how subjects behave when they can easily perceive that
i) their own payoffs increase in their appropriation of public re-
sources and ii) societal costs are higher than their individual ben-
eﬁts from this appropriation. 
Our evidence shows that the introduction of a price for each
unit extracted from a common fund does not reduce withdrawals,
unless subjects have never been granted before free access to the
common resource. 
While we do not observe any negative demand effect, there is
also no sign of a “crowding-out” of potential cooperation due to
the presence of a price. Results in the BC treatment show that, un-
der a small co-payment, keeping intact the conﬂict between in-
dividual and collective incentives, cooperation decays following a
similar path as in the Baseline and, in general, with a trend com-
patible to what is observed in most voluntary contribution mech-
anism public good experiments. 
Extraction levels are lower in the C treatment, with prices from
the ﬁrst round, so that the rules are the same as in rounds 16–
30 of the BC treatment. While we may expect convergence when
the rules become identical in treatments C and BC, differences in
withdrawals remain signiﬁcant in rounds 16–30. 
We can conclude that even a small price, which leaves intact
the individual incentive to appropriate common funds, can curb
over-consumption provided that it exists from the outset . Otherwise,
we do ﬁnd a negative demand effect on the private appropriation
of common funds, despite the fact that payoff maximization would
still drive towards the complete depletion of common resources, as
the price in this case should discourage appropriation among some
subjects. 
Seeing the same issue from another point of view, the habit
formed while having extracted from the resource at no cost in the
ﬁrst place undermines the potential effectiveness of introducing a
co-payment. 
These observations and the current upwards trend in the impo-
sition of user charges leads to a potential research question on the
impact of future policy considerations to remove co-payments, for
instance when and if sustained growth allows to ease budgetary
pressures. A new “CB” treatment would show whether restoring
free access would lead to more, or less, selﬁsh appropriation in
comparison both to alternative contexts in which charges are pre-
served, and in those where they were never introduced. 
6. Conclusions 
Our experimental design isolates the effect of co-payments in
a context where subjects have complete information regarding the
rules of the game and a conﬂict exists between individual and col-
lective incentives, potentially leading to full depletion of common
funds. 
We ﬁnd that, following a history of free access, the introduction
of a small per extraction unit price does not reduce the amount
an individual withdraws from a common resource, neither in com-
parison with a case in which an access price is never introduced
nor with a case in which extraction is initially free of charge and
then becomes costly. Hence, our evidence indicates that imposing
co-payments on previously free services does not foster “social co-
operation”, in the sense of limiting selﬁsh over-consumption. Please cite this article as: A. García-Gallego et al., An experimental s
Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101On the other hand, an access price does lead to lower extrac-
ion levels when it exists from the beginning of the session. Re-
arkably, extraction levels in the Copay treatment remain roughly
onstant after the ﬁrst few rounds until the end of the experiment
round 30). On the contrary, extraction increases steadily in the
ther two treatments, most notably in the last rounds of treatment
C, in which the price is introduced after round 15. 
Field experiments by Cárdenas and Ostrom (2004) have inspired
 plethora of studies showing that a decision maker’s past expe-
ience from the real world determines behavior in common pool
xtraction settings. Our ﬁndings show that experience from the
arly periods of the experiment can also affect behavior in sub-
equent periods. Speciﬁcally, exposure to a completely free access
egime renders the use of co-payment ineffective as a means of
educing over-exploitation of public resources. On the contrary,
 copayment achieves the desired objectives if not preceded by
ree access regimes. As said above, it appears that free extrac-
ion spoils the future effectiveness of a co-payment in reducing
ver-consumption. 
Some caveats of the present study are in order. First, we do not
ddress the possibility that individual beneﬁts are smaller than the
o-payment imposed. Of course, in this case there would be no
onﬂict, because refraining from using public resources would be
oth individually and collectively optimal. 
Our design does not address the risk of under-consumption .
ome people, especially the poor, may refrain from using health-
are resources despite the fact that their beneﬁts could com-
ensate the social costs of providing healthcare services. In this
ase, not only would equity be hampered but also long-run public
xpenditure could actually increase, for instance through higher
osts of hospital services due to worsening health conditions in
he population. 
Some features of our design may limit the external validity of
ur ﬁndings. In particular, for the sake of simplicity, we have cho-
en a linear payoff function, despite the fact that the marginal soci-
tal costs of over-consumption may well be increasing rather than
onstant, while marginal beneﬁts could be decreasing. However,
e think that our simple design is adequate for the analysis of be-
avior in a situation where users understand the key aspects of the
rade-off between individual and collective interests. 
The investigation on the effects of introducing a price to ser-
ices previously offered free of charge is clearly relevant for policy-
aking. Our ﬁndings indicate that relying on the focal effect of
rice and on the pain of paying per se , even if the quantity is
ow, does not appear justiﬁed. On the other hand, our experimen-
al data highlight the effectiveness of im posing a price to reduce
xcessive use of services that have never been provided for free.
t appears that, in those cases, the presence of co-payments does
rovide an effective nudge to refrain from the full appropriation of
 common resource. 
Further research is required to ensure the robustness of these
ndings, for instance by varying the payoff parameters or the
roup size. Another potential research development would focus
n the interplay of co-payments with other factors such as income
nequality and the launch of campaigns to make people aware of
he social cost of funding healthcare services. Experimental analy-
is may also shed light on behavioral impacts of policy options to
emove existing co-payments. 
We believe that experiments can complement both theoretical
dvances and the collection of empirical evidence in relation to
he funding of public services affecting citizens´welfare. The pos-
ibility to isolate relevant aspects in the lab can help developing
ound policy-making towards the sustainable provision of high-
uality services. In this perspective, our evidence casts doubts on
he effectiveness of the introduction of co-payments on existing,
ree-of-charge public services for cost-containment purposes, whiletudy on the effect of co-payment in public services, Journal of 
6/j.socec.2016.08.002 
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 etting prices on access to new services could instead succeed as a
eans of limiting over-consumption. 
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ppendix 
nstructions 3 (translated from Spanish) 
Welcome to this experiment, thanks a lot for your participation.
From this moment, please turn off your mobile and you shall
ot communicate in any way with the other participants during
he session. Please read these instructions carefully and raise your
and if you have any doubts. Your questions will be answered pri-
ately by one of the organizers of this experiment. 
Depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other par-
icipants, you may earn an amount of money that will be privately
aid to you in cash at the end of the session. 
In each round, each participant will be assigned to a group of 5
embers of the room. None of the members will know the iden-
ity of the other members of the group. The group formation pro-
ess will be carried out randomly and independently at the begin-
ing of each round. 
This session will consist of a series of rounds. These instructions
re valid throughout all rounds. In case something changes during
he session, you will be given speciﬁc instructions. 
ecision-making 
• At the beginning of each round, the group is given a common
fund worth 100 euro. 
• Each group member can withdraw from the common fund an
integer between 0 and 10, to take in into his/her private fund.
Each euro transferred to a private fund reduces the common
fund in 2 euro. 
• [Only for co-payment ] For each unit you withdraw from the
common fund, you have to pay 0.1 p. (a tenth of a euro). For
example, if you withdraw 5 euro from the common fund, you
have to pay 0.5 euro. This quantity is subtracted from your
private fund and it goes to the common fund, which will be
shared among the ﬁve members of the group. 
• This decision is taken each round simultaneously by each mem-
ber of the group. 
• Therefore, at the end of each round the quantity in the com-
mon fund will equal 100 minus the double of all the amounts
withdrawn by group members plus one ﬁfth of the amounts
extracted by the ﬁve members of the group. 
• Deﬁning as X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 , X 5 the amounts withdrawn by the
ﬁve members of the group, the common fund will be: 
Common Fund = 100 − 2 X 1 − 2 X 2 − 2 X 3 − 2 X 4 − 2 X 5 
+ 0 . 1 · [ X 1 + X 2 + X 3 + X 4 + X 5 ] 3 These are the instructions for the Baseline. The instructions for treatment BC 
re the same as in the Baseline for the ﬁrst 15 periods. After round 15, an an- 
ouncement is given that, from the following round, the subject has to pay 0.1 per 
nit and the amount collected enters the common fund. 
M  
 
O  
P  
Please cite this article as: A. García-Gallego et al., An experimental s
Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101• At the end of each round, the quantity left in the common fund
will be shared equally among the ﬁve members of the group. 
• Your outcome in the round will be equal to the sum of your
private fund and a ﬁfth of the quantity left in the common
fund. For example, if you are member “1” your payoff will be: 
X 1 − 0 . 1 · X 1 + 1 / 5 [ 100 − 2 X 1 − 2 X 2 − 2 X 3 − 2 X 4 − 2 X 5 
+ 0 . 1 ( X 1 + X 2 + X 3 + X 4 + X 5 ) ] 
• At the end of each round, the experimentalist will inform you
about your payoff, indicating how much of it comes from your
private fund, and how much from the common fund. 
ayoffs 
At the end of the session a random selection will pick the round
hat will determine your payoff in the experiment. The amount 
ill be privately paid in cash at the end of the session. 
The instructions for the Baseline are the same except the parts
aking reference to the 0.1 euro that is paid and its impact on
he common fund. The instructions for the Baseline + Copay are the
ame as in the Baseline. After round 15 an announcement is given
hat, from the following round, the subject has to pay 0.1 per unit
nd the amount collected enters the common fund. 
uestions 
1. If you withdraw €7 from the common fund, how much is the
reduction in the common fund? 
2. For each unit you withdraw from the common fund, how much
does each group member lose assuming that the rest of the
members do not withdraw? How much do you gain, consider-
ing the impact on your share of the common fund and on your
private fund? 
3. If each member withdraws €0 from the common fund, how
much does each group member get at the end of the round? 
4. If each member withdraws €5 from the common fund, how
much does each group member get at the end of the round? 
5. If each member withdraws €10 from the common fund, how
much does each group member get at the end of the round? 
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